Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP81M00980R001600090008 ම

OLC #78-198

2.4 MAY 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation, 23 May 1978 (with flexident

- Presented the NATO-Warsaw Pact comparison book. Went through it page by page. There was a comment that the figures on tanks didn't coincide with those the Vice President is putting in a speech. The Vice President was using 3 to 1; our figures were different both for peacetime and mobilization. David Aaron was requested to be sure the Vice President played it conservatively.
 - Emphasized the sensitivity and NOFORN nature of the effectiveness chart. Was asked if there were data for anti-tank weapons. I said I assumed so because on graphic 6 we had a comparison of anti-tank weapons.
 - b. Was asked whether the US military would judge these effectiveness figures in the opposite way. I said yes, specifically with respect to tactical aircraft, the estimate was different and pointed to the qualitative improvements as indicative of why.
 - c. On the theater nuclear systems, comment was made that it was the MRBMs that really gave the problem. David Aaron pointed out, yes, but we had central systems that could also be applied here. I pointed out that these charts didn't include warheads.
 - d. We only looked briefly at the two MBFR charts but not the text.
- 2. Was asked to insure that Harold Brown and Cy Vance got copies of this NATO-Warsaw Pact comparison book so that the briefing books they prepared for him would not be different or that he wouldn't have to go through the same material twice.

25X1

25X1

A Section Line 8